Its potential as a threat to national unity became manifest in early 2000, when Senator Arthur Nzeribe moved a motion in the Senate for the impeachment of President Olusegun Obasanjo. There was uproar in Yorubaland, with Governor Tinubu declaring the then Imo West Senator a persona non grata in Lagos State. The matter actually became a threat to the stability of Nigeria in late 2009 to mid-2010, when President Umaru Yar-Adua was terminally ill, and there was resistance from the North to the takeover of power by the Vice President (Goodluck Jonathan). Section 146 of the Constitution provides that “[the] Vice-President shall hold the office of President if the office of President becomes vacant by reason of death or resignation, impeachment, permanent incapacity or the removal of the President from office for any other reason in accordance with section 143 of this Constitution.” Section 191 of the Constitution makes a similar provision for the office of the Deputy Governor. These stipulations make sense, as they are meant to prevent a power vacuum and, thus, instability in the country or a state. So why is succession by a Vice-President/Deputy Governor a factor of instability in Nigeria?
Section 14 (3) of the 1999 Constitution provides that “[t]he composition of the Government of the Federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and also to command national loyalty, thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few States or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that Government or in any of its agencies.” In keeping with the spirit of this provision of Nigeria’s Constitution, presidential and governorship candidates pick their running mates from outside their geopolitical zones. For presidential elections, each candidate picks from outside her region, with region being either of the colonial protectorates of Northern Nigeria and Southern Nigeria). For governorship elections, each candidate is expected to pick his/her running mate from a senatorial zone other than his/her own. Having a pair of candidates from different geopolitical zones is said to be a balanced ticket. Nigerians are convinced that this is expedient and proper. Thus, except in 1978 when a presidential candidate that hailed from southern Nigeria (Obafemi Awolowo) chose another southern Nigerian (Philip Umeadi) as his running mate, no political party has, to the best of my knowledge, gone against this practice.
However, as the examples above indicate, this practice is, ironically, also a threat to the stability of Nigeria. Balanced ticket as a threat to the stability of Nigeria stems basically from another objective of the Nigerian political system – the desire for rotation of power. It is believed that, for the sake of equity, geographically broad loyalty to the nation or to a state, and, ultimately, for the stability of the country, no zone in Nigeria or any state should monopolize the office of president and, in each state, the office of governor. Although rotation, like balanced ticket, is not stipulated in the Nigerian Constitution, it is taken seriously by the people, and much effort has been made to achieve it. Some states have achieved it so far, like Akwa Ibom, Delta, Enugu, and Ebonyi. Many are yet to do so, like Benue and Ogun.
While it is conceded that both objectives (balanced ticket and rotation) are reasonable, our experience since 1999 has shown that both objectives are incompatible. This is basically because, under Sections 146 and 191 of the Constitution cited above, the practice of balanced ticket ensures that the geopolitical zone where the president or governor comes from would, in Nigerian political belief, lose power to another zone if a President or Governor from the zone is unable to complete his term of office or is stopped from doing so. Thus, going by the examples above, the Yoruba opposed the impeachment of Obasanjo because the President’s exit would have made a northerner (Vice President Atiku Abubakar) become President. As former Vice-President Alex Ekwueme observed at the time, the opposition from Yorubaland would have been much less if the Vice President and prospective successor was another Yoruba man. Given the situation, the case against Obasanjo could not be considered on its merits. For the same reason, northerners did not want Jonathan to succeed Yar’Adua. The opposition did not eventually stop Jonathan from becoming President. But the North was aggrieved that it did not fully enjoy its turn to rule. This was particularly unacceptable to them because a southerner had held power for two terms before the accession of Yar’Adua. Given the situation, too, the case for the replacement of the ailing President from late 2009 to May 2010 was not strictly considered on its merit.
To resolve the incompatibility of balanced ticket and rotation, one of them has to be sacrificed. I assume that the latter is more important than the former. Balanced ticket does not really provide for (owing to lack of a better term) a balance of power when the candidate and his/her running mate assume office. The office of President/Governor and that of Vice President/Deputy Governor are not equal. The former does not share power with the latter. The latter does only what the former permits him/her to do. Indeed, many, like Atiku Abubakar in 2003-07, have been made redundant by the President/Governor and humiliated in several other ways. Thus, except if the objective of balanced ticket is to make power shift to another geopolitical zone in the event of a death or impeachment of a President/Governor, the practice does not ensure that the enormous powers of a President/Governor is distributed in such a way as to prevent any geopolitical zone from taking undue advantage of others in the allocation of resources. Indeed, as the American presidential historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. wrote in 1974, “the ‘balanced ticket’ is … a fraud on the public. It pretends that the Vice President’s views ‘balance’ the views of the President when all our history testifies that they have no impact at all on the President”. I venture to add that, if he/she so desires, a Nigerian President can ignore and marginalize a Vice-President more flagrantly than a President in an older, stable democracy. It is needful to add that, theoretically, a balance of power can only come through a collegial presidency. Sometime in the 1990s, former Vice-President Alex Ekwueme made a case for it. But the idea did not catch on, probably because it is not common in the world.
In contrast to balanced ticket, rotation allows power to go round: it allows what one zone has presumably enjoyed to be enjoyed in turns by others. Theoretically, it enables areas that feel marginalized in one regime to get restitution under another regime. The expectation that each zone’s turn will come is likely to help to moderate resentment in a country against a regime that is considered extremely parochial. Generally, rotation is the preferred way for the reflection of the federal character. Thus, the absence of rotation is a greater threat to national loyalty and unity than the absence of balanced ticket.
If it is accepted that rotation is more important than balanced ticket, if it is accepted that balanced ticket is a threat to rotation, if there is no appetite for collegial presidency or its equivalent at the state level, the Nigerian Constitution has to be amended to actualize what we need and desire. One needed amendment is to make rotation a constitutional stipulation. Another amendment, a needful addendum to rotation, is to abolish the office of Vice President/Deputy Governor and to stipulate that, in the event of the death or impeachment of a President/Governor, another person from his/her geopolitical zone be chosen to replace him/her. Alternatively, there should be a provision that every candidate must pick his/her running mate from his/her own geopolitical zone. I am convinced that these commonsense solutions will address the running mate matter and conduce to national unity.
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The main argument of this paper suggests that tension about the likelihood of one of our major parties having a Muslim-Muslim ticket is unnecessary. Power belongs to the President and, in the executive branch of government, he/she alone can take measures to protect the interests of the adherents of religions other than his/her own.
Okechukwu Edward Okeke is a Professor of History at Federal University Otuoke, Nigeria. He can be reached via okeyedwardokeke@yahoo.com or okekeoe@fuotuoke.edu.ng.
