This essay is in two parts. Part I is an excerpt from my inaugural lecture. Entitled “Of Restructuring and Related Matters: The Historian as Moderator.” It was delivered at the Federal University Otuoke, Bayelsa State, Nigeria, on September 4, 2019. The excerpt is taken from pages 80 to 91 of the lecture. Apart from the deletion of footnotes, it is published here exactly as it was delivered, complete with salutations to the Vice Chancellor, several references to my previous work on the subject, and a table. Part II, to be published in two days’ time, is an entirely new effort.
Rotational presidency
Laws meant to allot positions in government and the civil service on the basis of a quota system were adopted in this country during the First Republic. But it became a constitutional issue during the transition programme of 1975-79. Making the case for the inclusion of the federal character provision in the 1979 Constitution, the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) of 1975-76 stated in its report that
[it] is …essential to have some provisions to ensure that the predominance of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic or other sectional groups is avoided in the composition of government or the appointment or election of persons to high offices in the state.The matter was debated by the Constituent Assembly. Southern delegates generally opposed quota for civil service jobs, while Northerners did not want it for elective offices. Those that opposed the quota system or simply quota argued that it would be discriminatory against merit, and that it would alienate persons who, on the basis of their place of origin, are denied positions they merit. In short, they held that quota system would adversely affect commitment to the progress of Nigeria and, because it is not strictly based on merit, adversely affect government performance. The opposing argument was that the quota system would “promote national unity” and help to “command national loyalty”. Based on the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly and its own views on the matter, the Supreme Military Council adopted the latter argument, and the recommendation became Section 14 (3) of the 1979 Constitution:
The composition of the Government of the Federation or any of its agencies and the conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such a manner as to reflect the federal character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and also to command national loyalty thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few states or from a few ethnic or sectional groups in the government or of its agencies.
Section 14 (4) of the same Constitution further stipulated the adoption of the same principles in the composition of the governments of states and local governments.
I dealt with this subject in an article in 2011. Concerning the provision quoted above, I made the following observation: “the federal character provisions in the 1979 Constitution applied to … appointive political offices and public service jobs. It did not apply to the ‘election of persons to high offices of the state’”. I would like to share with you some of my 2011 views on this subject and to end this lecture with an addendum. But permit me to anchor my views on a firmer historical background. As stated above, it was largely due to opposition from the North that there was no stipulation for the reflection of the federal character in respect of the “election of persons to high offices of the state”. Their view was that merit should not be compromised, and that whoever is to become President or Governor should be acceptable to the generality of the ethnic groups and regions of the country. But Northern leaders believed that there is a natural resentment against monopoly and injustice and, thus, that voters would not allow any ethnic group or region to monopolize power. I recall one politician from the North saying sometime in the mid-1990s that the mood of the nation at an election period, rather than constitutional provisions, should determine where the President will come from. He added that the mood of the nation changes from time to time.
In keeping with the mood of the nation principle, it was expected that after the scheduled completion of President Shagari second term in 1987, a Southerner would become President. There were credible rumours in the press that Vice President Alex Ekwueme and the Chairman of the ruling party at the time Adisa Akinloye were already scheming to run for the position in 1987. When Shagari was overthrown in December 1983, barely three months after he started his second term, one of the conspiracy theories associated with the coup was that it was a plan by the North to prevent power from rotating to the South in 1987!
Northern rule continued after the fall of Shagari under Mohammadu Buhari (1984-85) and Ibrahim Babangida (1985-93). The Babangida regime announced a transition programme in 1985 and began to implement it in 1987. The regime did not stipulate the reflection of federal character for elective offices. However, there was a strong campaign by Southerners for a Southerner to become President. It was a serious matter. The presidential election under the transition programme was scheduled to be held in late 1992. This was the time I published my Hausa-Fulani Hegemony. It is not surprising that the last two paragraphs of the book addressed this matter: Here are excerpts:
If the question of where the President comes from is important…, it behoves our political leaders to view it soberly and resolve it justly, in a manner that would promote national unity and progress. It is our submission that, more than any other thing, the emergence of a southerner as President in 1992 [will] assure all Nigerians that it is not given to any part of the country to dominate the others, that there are no first class and second class citizens in the country, that any Nigerian with …leadership skills has about as much chance as any other Nigerian to become President. In short, the emergence of a southern President would…help to minimize inter-group tension and smother the flames of separatism flickering in the hearts of many Nigerians from the politically alienated parts of the country…A southern President in 1992: this is a sine qua non of peace and stability in the Third Republic.
Partly because of this quest to end Hausa-Fulani hegemony, Moshood Abiola, a Yoruba candidate, was elected President in June 1993. But he was not allowed to assume power. Rather, after the stop-gap Interim National Government (August-November 1993), another Northerner (Sani Abacha) took over control of the federal government. Abacha wanted to legitimize his rule and even extend it. Thus, among other things, he convened what became known as the Constitutional Conference of 1994-95. The difference between North and South on the matter of place of origin of the President (an issue that was dubbed “rotational presidency”) resulted in a deadlock. This time the North ceded ground. It was agreed that the post of President would be rotated between the North and South for a period of twenty-four years after which zoning would be abolished. It was further agreed that the same principle of rotation would apply to the positions of Governor and local government Chairman. To remove complications in the process, the Conference also agreed that each President/Governor/Chairman would rule for only one term.
The Abacha regime adopted the principle of rotation but modified it to serve the personal interests of General Abacha. Rather than rotation between North and South, the regime divided the country into six geopolitical zones and stipulated the post of President as well as five others—three Vice presidents, Prime Minister, etc.—would rotate among the six zones, with the occupant of each office entitled to only one term. To ensure that death, disability or impeachment would not stop any zone from serving out its term in the Presidency, the unpublished 1995 Constitution further stipulated that the first Vice-President (one of the three Vice-Presidents) would come from the same zone as the President. It is needful to note that, basically because Abacha wanted to succeed himself, he did not stipulate any order of precedence among the zones. This meant that the order of precedence would be determined by elections. Any zone that wins and serves out its term will go to the rear and will not compete until all the others had occupied the post.
Abacha died on 8 June 1998, and his transition programme was aborted. The Abubakar regime started a new transition programme. In late 1998, the Abubakar regime appointed a committee headed by a Supreme Court Justice, Niki Tobi, to consult with opinion leaders across the country and ascertain the wishes of Nigerians with regard to the Constitution of the anticipated new era of civil rule. The Tobi committee reported that Nigerians preferred the 1979 Constitution to the unpublished 1995 Constitution. Thus, the Abubakar regime brought back the 1979 Constitution, added a few “transitional provisions” (like the law setting up the Federal Character Commission as a statutory agency) and gave the country the 1999 Constitution. Permit me to add that, like the 1979 Constitution, there is no provision for rotation of power in the 1999 Constitution.
Given that there had been prolonged Northern rule, there was something of a national consensus for a “power shift” to the South. Besides, given that a Yoruba candidate had been prevented from becoming President after winning the presidential election of 1993, it was apparent that the North wanted to appease the Yoruba. Not surprisingly the only two candidates for the presidential election, Olusegun Obasanjo and Olu Falae, were Yoruba. After eight years of Obasanjo’s rule, there was something of a national consensus that a Northerner should succeed Obasanjo. It was against that background that Umaru Yar’Adua was elected President in 2007. Yar’Adua’s illness and eventual death (2009-10) showed how important the place of origin of the President is taken in Nigeria. The North was convinced that it was its turn to rule for eight years. Thus, there were behind-the-scene plans to prevent Jonathan from assuming power. When Jonathan eventually assumed power, he came under pressure not to contest the 2011 election. He contested and won. But his victory was followed by rioting and killing of Southerners in some Northern states.
Jonathan’s victory gave an opportunity to the South-South zone to produce a president that ruled this country for four more years. But tension remained: the North was still convinced it was its turn to rule, and continued to question the legitimacy of Jonathan’s rule. Buhari exacerbated the tension by insisting that the election that gave Jonathan victory was rigged and promising that the “dog and baboon would soak in blood” in 2015 if the election was rigged again. Buhari’s victory in 2015 ended the North-South tension rooted in the question of the region of origin of the President.
Why was Jonathan’s accession in 2010 controversial? The answer was the uncritical adoption of the provision of the United States Constitution that created the post of Vice President. Nigerians that are concerned about political marginalization are grateful to that provision for enabling Jonathan to become President. However, in the absence of constitutional provisions for power rotation, that provision, coupled with the provision for two terms of office for each President (as well as Governor) is a threat to what the Nigerian political elite seem to have agreed on: consensual power rotation. This is especially because it has been the practice in the country for each candidate to choose his running mate from another section of the country. The unpublished 1995 Constitution dealt with this problem, as we have seen above. In my 2011 article, I recommended the following: the abolition of the post of Vice President (as well as Deputy Governor); one term of six years; that in the event of the death, incapacitation or impeachment of a President or Governor, the national or state assembly should pick somebody from his zone to serve out the zone’s term; and rotation among the six geopolitical zones of the country and the three senatorial zones of each state.
The present government is not interested in restructuring and seems strong enough to prevent the convening of any conference that can adopt provisions like the one above. Thus, it is in the context of consensual rotation of power that the struggle to reflect the federal character in elective offices has to be waged, in 2023.
Permit me to say, as the critics of quota system argued in 1977-78, that I am aware of the viewpoint that power rotation is the least of the problems we should be discussing at this critical stage in our country’s history, when the rest of the world has gone digital and even thinking of settling humans in Mars, etc. etc. I am familiar with the argument that unity can easily be achieved by good government, which would abolish poverty, and that our concern should be to find a good leader not minding her ethnicity or religion. You know the rest of the argument. I am also familiar with the Marxist view on these matters: that the elite are united in the pursuit of their interests and are using ethnicity and religion to divide and rule the masses. You also know the rest of the argument. But exponents of these views make one important mistake: not being able to distinguish what is important from what should be important. Mr. Vice Chancellor, WHAT IS IMPORTANT IS WHAT IS IMPORTANT. What is important is what matters to you, what troubles you, what engages you, what will make you go to war. If a clan meeting is convened to plan how to contain an epidemic and, during the accreditation of delegates, an age-old dispute over seniority among the villages leads to a dispute that stops the meeting from taking place, it means that the question of seniority among the villages is important, and that unless it is addressed the clan would be unable to deal with other important problems.
Now let us end this.
Consensual power rotation was adopted to give a chance to leadership talents in relatively small and/or marginalized sections of the country to serve the country. It is meant to promote justice and national loyalty. For it is believed that without justice there would hardly be unity and stability.
I crave your indulgence to bore this audience with this very familiar graphic list of past and present civilian and military leaders of Nigeria.
TABLE 5
GEOPOLITICAL ZONES OF HEADS OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, SINCE 1960
| SN | GEO-POLITICAL ZONE | NAME & TITLE | PERIOD
OF RULE |
DURATION
OF RULE |
DURATION
OF RULE |
| 1
|
NORTH-WEST | Murtala Mohammed
(Head of State) |
29 July 1975-13 February 1976 | 6 months | 18 years & 10 months
(22 years and 10 months in 2023) |
| Alhaji Shehu Shagari
(President) |
1 October 1979-31 December 1983 | 4 years & 2 months | |||
| Major-General Mohammadu Buhari
(Head of State) |
1 January 1984-27August 1985 | 1 year and 7 months | |||
| General Sani Abacha
(Head of State) |
18 November 1993-8 June 1998 | 5 years & 7 months | |||
| Umaru Yar’Adua
(President) |
29 May 2007-5 May 2010 | 3 years | |||
| Mohammadu Buhari
(President) |
Since 29 May 2015 | 4 years so far
(8 years by 2023) |
|||
| 2
|
NORTH-CENTRAL | Yakubu Gowon
(Head of State) |
1 August 1966-29 July 1975 | 9 years | 18 years (approx) |
| Ibrahim Babangida
(military President) |
27 August 1985-26 August 1993 | 8 years | |||
| Abdusalami Abubakar
(Head of State) |
8 June 1998-29 May 1999 | 11 months | |||
| 3 | SOUTH-WEST | Olusegun Obasanjo
(Head of State) |
13 February 1976-1 October 1979 | 3 years & 8 months | 12 years (approx) |
| Ernest Shonekan
(Head of Interim National Government) |
26 August 1993-18 November 1993 | 3 months (approx) | |||
| Olusegun Obasanjo
(President) |
29 May 1999-29 May 2007 | 8 years | |||
| 4 | NORTH-EAST | Abubakar Tafawa-Balewa
(Prime Minister) |
1 October 1960-15 January 1966 | 5 years | 5 years |
| 5 | SOUTH-SOUTH | Goodluck Jonathan
(President) |
10 May 2010-29 May 2015 | 5 years | 5 years |
| 6 | IGBOLAND
(South-East & some parts of South-South) |
Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi
(Head of State) |
16 January 1966-29 July 1966 | 6 months | 6 months |
It is my hope and prayer that President Buhari will, in 2023, complete the North’s turn of eight years as the home region of the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Nigeria. Thus, the practice of consensual power rotation would demand that a Southerner be elected President in 2023. TABLE 5 further shows that, among the Southern geopolitical zones, Serial No.6 has an unimpeachable claim to the benefit of consensual rotation of power. Mr. Vice Chancellor, it should be our collective responsibility to help to ensure its actualization.
Okechukwu Edward Okeke is a Professor of History at Federal University Otuoke, Bayelsa State, Nigeria. He can be reached via okeyedwardokeke@yahoo.com or okekeoe@fuotuoke.edu.ng
