Home / News / Local / For an Igbo President   PART TWO By Prof. Okechukwu Edward Okeke
Map of Nigeria

For an Igbo President   PART TWO By Prof. Okechukwu Edward Okeke

Map of Nigeria
Prof. Okechukwu Okeke

The clue to the subject of this part of the essay is the oddity of Row No. 6 on the Table above. Rather than South-East, one of the six geopolitical zones of Nigeria, the sixth zone of the table is “Igboland”, which is defined as “the South-East and some parts of the South-South”. The objective of this essay is to stress the point that the primordial criterion for determining that a President of Nigeria is an Igbo President should be the person’s Igboness—that the person is Igbo by identity and culture. It should not necessarily be that the person’s state of origin is one of the five in the South-East geopolitical zone. The person just needs to be Igbo and to have a history of proudly identifying himself as such. Such a person’s state of origin can be any of the following: Abia, Anambra, Delta, Ebonyi, Enugu, Imo and Rivers.

It is important to raise this matter because, in the view of many persons outside the South-East states, the injustice that needs to be redressed in terms of control of the federal government is injustice against an ethnic group rather than against a geo-political zone. Thus, to illustrate, when in early 2016 President Muhammadu Buhari was told that he had marginalized Ndigbo in top appointments, he asked: “Who is running the Central Bank? Who is running the oil ministry”?   At the time, the two positions he mentioned were held by Godwin Emefiele and Ibe Kachikwu, respectively.  Both of them hail from Delta State. It was not easy for Ndigbo to controvert Buhari’s view on the matter. To do so would be to deny that the two persons are not Igbo.  Earlier, in late 2014, when it was apparent that Nyesom Wike was likely to become the governorship candidate of the PDP in Rivers State, other candidates of the party from the Eleme-Ogoni and Ijaw areas of the state kicked against his candidature. Their grouse was that after sixteen years of Peter Odili and Chibuike Amaechi, it would be unjust to allow another Igbo person to become Governor again. Note that they did not say another Ikwerre man: they said another Igbo man.  To further illustrate, as the Vanguard columnist Ocherome Nnanna related in July 2020, Pa Edwin Clark opposed the candidature of Peter Odili for President in 2007. According to him, Clark “reminded him that as a Ndoni man, he was Igbo and not an ‘authentic’ Southern Minority to benefit from their agitation for the presidency.”

In the article by Nnanna, he made a compelling case for making Igboland, rather than merely the South-East geopolitical zone, the catchment area for the President of Igbo extraction. In his own words, “The South East is a copy of the defunct East Central State which was imposed on Ndi Igbo after the war to abnegate the true size of the Igbo nation. Clinging to it is like deifying what your enemy gave you as your portion. An Igbo person anywhere, irrespective of the circumstances of history, is still Igbo.”

Neither of the two leading political parties has zoned its presidential ticket to the South, let alone to Ndigbo or the South-East. Assuming that both parties zone it to the South rather than any of the three zones in the South, Ndigbo would have to contend with other groups in the South to get the ticket. It is therefore surprising that, rather than approach the struggle for the ticket on a truly pan-Igbo front and with the belief that any able Igbo person for the post is preferable to any able non-Igbo Southerner, some South-East Igbo are more concerned to disqualify non-South-East Igbo from seeking to become President in 2023. Probably the most prominent Igbo person to do so is former Senate President Anyim Pius Anyim.

In a lecture he delivered in December 2020, he conceded that division of Nigeria into six geo-political zones is yet to be “constitutionalised”, but he added that the division into six zones had been politically adopted and was being used for appointments and resource allocation. Thus, the former Senate President held that “a political benefit accruing to any geo-political zone cannot be satisfied by appointing any person outside of that geo-political zone irrespective of commonality of language or culture, i.e. political office zoned to the South East does not extend to Igbos from a zone outside the South-East geo-political zone.”

The position of Senator Anyim is widely shared by many educated Igbo. Some of them give other reasons for their position. Among other things, they say that Ndigbo from Delta and Rivers states often deny their Igboness and prefer to be identified by their sub-ethnic identities (Ikwerre, Ekpeye, Ukwuani, Ika, etc) or new ones like Anioma. Indeed, many South-East Igbo allege that, to convince non-Igbo Nigerians that they are not Igbo, the Igbo people of the South-South, especially those of Rivers State and the Ika and Ukwuani of Delta State, hate Ndigbo and are hostile to them. This view is not entirely wrong. But, more importantly, it is also true that the Igbo of the South-East regard themselves as “core” Igbo people and see those of the two states as somewhat incomplete Ndigbo, and are often contemptuous of them and make fun of their dialects.  It is also true that large numbers of Ndigbo from these states have ignored the identity preferences of their sub-groups, risked political and social isolation in their communities, and strongly identified themselves as Igbo. For instance, before Odili’s emergence as Governor, a time when it was something of a taboo for any Rivers person to identify as Igbo, Francis Ellah (an Omoku man and senator during the Second Republic) identified himself as Igbo and attended meetings of Ohaneze Ndigbo. Uche Okwukwu, an Ikwerre man, has in recent years been one of the most prominent advocates of Igbo unity and champion of the Igbo cause. Several persons from the Oshimili and Aniocha areas of Delta State have lost many friends from the Ika and Ukwuani areas over the reluctance of the later to identify as Igbo. Living in almost exclusively Igbo states and not facing the challenges ethnic minorities face at the state level, it is not easy for Ndigbo of the South East to appreciate the courage and ethnic patriotism of such persons.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             At crucial times in the history of modern Nigeria (Nigeria since 1900), Ndigbo of the South-East have found it expedient to ignore the political boundaries between the South-East zone and the Igbo culture areas outside the zone. One of those crucial times, arguably the most crucial, was in 1966-70. When, in September 1966, the Military Governor of the Eastern Region expelled all non-Easterners from the region, he made two exceptions: the Igbo and the Ijaw of the Mid-West. Why did he do so? Because he knew that political boundaries are ephemeral and that, when very important matters like breakup of a country are to be decided, cultural identity is more important than political identity. Some of the Igbo groups outside the Eastern Region shared the same view. I have had cause to argue orally at two public events that the greatest Biafrans were the Igbo people of the then Mid-Western Region (Delta State today). This accolade is fitting because, unlike the Igbo of the Eastern Region, they volunteered to become Biafrans. Permit me to expatiate. Although there was popular support among Ndigbo for secession after the pogroms of 1966 in Northern Nigeria, the interest was sustained by propaganda and pressure by the regional government. With the return of soldiers and policemen to their regions of origin, the regional government was in exclusive control of both the mass media and the coercive apparatus of the state. Thus, among other things, Igbo and minority elements that did not want a breakup of the country could not publicly express their views. They included military officers, the old politicians, some intellectuals and business interests. Such persons included military officers, the old politicians, some intellectuals and business interests. Those who tried to do so were detained, even if privately (like Colonel Hilary Njoku). It is conceivable that if there had been freedom of expression, the enthusiasm for secession in 1967 among the Igbo would have subsided. To some extent, therefore, Ndigbo in the Eastern Region were compelled to support secession. On the other hand, to stress a point already made, those in the Mid-West, being outside the reach of the Ojukwu-controlled army and police, could freely choose to support or reject secession. That they chose to support Biafra is a testimony to acceptance of their Igbo identity at a time when it was quite challenging to do so.

It is needful to understand the importance of the support of the Mid-West Igbo to Biafra. The shooting war started on 6 July 1967. Federal forces easily overran Biafran forces on the Ogoja and Nsukka fronts, and by early August were advancing unstoppably towards the Biafran capital, Enugu. It was at precisely this time that, with the connivance and active participation of the Mid-West Igbo, Biafra launched the invasion of the Mid-West and the West. It is established that the invasion compelled the federal government to disperse its forces and focus, and thereby delayed the fall of Enugu and ultimately the fall of Biafra. Thus, the war that could have ended in 1967, and thus justified General Gowon’s hope that the war would be a “police action”, dragged on till January 1970. Admittedly, more Igbo lives would have been saved if the war had ended in less than six months. But that would have been at the greater price of the humiliation of Ndigbo as an ethnic group. We know that Ndigbo ultimately lost the war, after losing more lives. However, basically because they held out against overwhelming forces for long, their ethnic patriotism and their martial and organizational qualities could not be derided. Indeed, these qualities earned them the respect of the victors. Thus, while the defeated Ndigbo literally and figuratively returned to Nigeria in rags, they did so with their heads high, without feeling inferior to any other ethnic group. Ndigbo of the former Eastern Region did not and could hardly have achieved this alone: the support of the Mid-West Igbo was crucial.

Aside from supporting Biafra, it is equally needful to add that, in both effort and sacrifice, the Mid-West Igbo were the greatest Biafrans. After the Biafran invasion of the Mid-West was repulsed, Igbo officers and men of the Mid-West joined the Biafran army and several others were recruited into the army. Army officers of Mid-West origin that served Biafra included Conrad Nwawo, Mike Okwechime, Macauley Nzefili, Albert Okonkwo, Sylvanus Nwanjei, and Chukwuma Nzeogwu. Other Igbo Mid-Westerners that were not previously military officers but played prominent roles in the fighting included Joe Achuzia and Professor Chukwuka Okonjo (who headed the Biafran Organization of Freedom Fighters, BOFF). There is hardly any Igbo sub-group of comparable population size that, as it were, contributed more senior officers to the Biafran armed forces.  The sacrifices made by the Mid-West Igbo were equally enormous, in both real and comparative terms. With the so-called liberation of the Mid-West by federal forces, the Igbo people of the region were the targets of attacks in Benin City and other towns in the region. They paid the price for the punishments that ill-disciplined Biafran forces meted out to indigenes of the non-Igbo areas of the region. Reprisal attacks were so serious in Benin City that notices were posted on the walls and doors of many houses to indicate that no Igbo persons lived in them. As they advanced into the Igbo areas of the Mid-West, federal forces, who were also ill-disciplined and led by an ill-disciplined officer (Murtala Muhammed), committed war crimes, especially in the then Asaba Division. The doleful highlight of the war crimes was the mass shooting of a group of men in Asaba and the dumping of their bodies in the Niger.  Clearly, Ndigbo of the Mid-West suffered more than most other Igbo groups for their support for Biafra.

Another crucial time that Ndigbo of the Mid-West (then called Bendel State) as well as those of Rivers State showed their solidarity with Ndigbo of the South-East was the time of the 1979 elections. Nnamdi Azikiwe was the presidential candidate of the Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP). Although it seemed clear that the nationalist leader would not win the election, Ndigbo treated him as a favourite son and voted overwhelmingly for him and his party’s candidates for other elections. Except in Plateau State (which still had grudges against the Hausa-Fulani and the Yoruba for the execution of many military officers from the state after the abortive coup of February 1976), the NPP had no significant support outside Igboland. Despite being minorities in states where the predominant coalition of non-Igbo groups opposed or were indifferent to Azikiwe’s candidature, Ndigbo of these two states gave significant support to the NPP.  The NPP won two House of Representatives seats in the area of the old Asaba Division and, from the same area, the only four of the sixty seats in the Bendel State House of Assembly. In Rivers State, the NPP won two out of the five senatorial seats, four out of the fourteen House of Representative seats and fifteen of the forty-two House of Assembly seats.  Apart from the then Imo, Anambra and Plateau states, Azikiwe won the highest proportion of votes (14%) in Rivers State than in any other state in the presidential election.

Our account has shown that, at critical periods in contemporary Igbo history, the Igbo people of Delta and Rivers states have significantly ignored political boundaries and given primacy to cultural affinity.  The question is: Have Ndigbo of the South-East zone reciprocated the support of their co-ethnics outside this zone? I hesitate to give a definite answer here. But I recall that in 1979 Ndigbo of the South-East zone emphasized political lines of division over ethnic affinity. Michael Agbamuche was the courtroom leader of the team of lawyers that sought a judicial declaration that Nnamdi Azikiwe was not a tax dodger. The Asaba-born lawyer contested the 1979 election in Oshimili Federal Constituency and, as a candidate of Azikiwe’s NPP, was elected to the House of Representatives. On the basis of an accord made by the NPN and NPP at the federal level, the position of Speaker of the House of Representatives was given to Ndigbo. A few days before the inauguration of the Assembly, Michael Agbamuche was picked for the position. However, on the eve of the inauguration, it was decided to choose a “core Igbo” in preference to Agbamuche. Thus, Edwin Umezeoke, from the then Anambra State, became Speaker of the House of Representatives. I still hesitate to give a definite answer to the question raised above. But I don’t know what to call what happened to Agbamuche other than a betrayal of the greatest Igbo sub-group of the civil war era by other Igbo sub-groups.

I don’t believe in and don’t use the terms “core” and “peripheral” in reference to Ndigbo. For me, no Igbo person has greater ethnic authenticity than another. But I know that the basis of the attempt to exclude Igbo candidates of the South-South from seeking to become the much-desired President of Igbo extraction is the idea of core vis-à-vis peripheral Igbo. The thinking seems to be that it is only an Igbo person of the “core” area that can be fully trusted to champion the Igbo cause. This idea is rational. But it is not supported by experience. Sub-groups that are considered peripheral may have large numbers of persons that hate or are indifferent to those considered to be core or pure. But experience has shown that peripheral sub-groups and other outsiders have often produced the greatest champions, sometimes even overzealous champions, of many ethnic groups or nations. Examples include Napoleon (an Italic person from outside mainland France) in France; Adolf Hitler (an Austrian national) in Germany; Catherine the Great (a German married to a Russian king) in imperial Russia; Joseph Stalin (a Georgian) in Soviet Russia; and Kenneth Kaunda (a Malawian by birth) in Zambia. Coming closer home, as we have seen, collectively the Igbo people of the old Asaba Division were great champions of the Igbo cause in 1967-70. Some of the Biafran army officers from the sub-group, notably Joe Achuzia, were among the bravest Biafran commanders and, indeed, rather overzealous Biafrans. Maybe I should add this. Those who know him say that, as Commissioner of Police and Inspector-General of Police, Mike Okiro (from Rivers State) was more of a self identifying Igbo man and a more Igbo friendly officer than most police officers from the South-East zone. To conclude: there is no empirical evidence to indicate that any self identifying and ethnically proud Igbo person from Delta or Rivers State, even a repentant one, would be less committed to the Igbo cause than a so-called core Igbo person.  The outsider may even be the saviour.

Finally, there is no suggestion here that Pius Anyim and other Igbo presidential aspirants from the South-East geopolitical zone step down for candidates of Igbo origin from the South-South zone. The point is that, since there is no law or even political party position zoning the office of President to the South-East zone, the quest for a President of Igbo extraction should take precedence over the quest for a President from the South-East zone. At critical times, as indicated by President Buhari’s and Edwin Clark’s remarks cited above, the other groups in the country see us as one. To create divisions among us is to weaken our campaign for an Igbo President altogether.

Okechukwu Edward Okeke is a Professor of History at Federal University Otuoke, Nigeria. He can be reached via okeyedwardokeke@yahoo.com or okekeoe@fuotuoke.edu.ng

About admin

Check Also

Afreximbank dominates Bonds, Loans, ESG Capital Markets Awards 2024

CAIRO, Egypt, April 23, 2024 The African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank) (www.Afreximbank.com) swept the stage at the …

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *